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Abstract Since 1978, the Chinese reform policy has brought fast economic developments
and social change but also considerably higher crime levels. China’s rapid modernization
has resulted in a situation of increased opportunities and Durkheimian anomie. The Chinese
government responds to the worsening crime situation with punitive criminal sanctions,
especially under the ‘strike hard’ policy. However, a punitive crime control ideology and
repressive criminal norms are neither effective in stopping the crime wave nor in
compliance with the aim to establish the rule of law. After examining the negative effects
the strike hard policy has brought to the Chinese criminal justice, we present findings from
a recent web survey among Chinese students in Germany (N=ca. 900). We use these data to
explore the punitive attitudes, esp. towards the death penalty, among the Chinese young
elite.
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Introduction
Three decades have past since the initiation of the reform and open policy in 1978.
According to the National Bureau of Statistics of China (2008), the economic reform
towards a market economy has brought unprecedented economic growth with an annual
economic growth rate of nearly 10%. The per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew
from 381 Chinese Yuan in 1978 to 18934 Chinese Yuan in 2007. However, the very low
recorded crime rates in China (Fairbank 1987; Dutton 1997; Deng and Cordilia 1999) gave
way to an increase of crime even before the economic reform began (Graph 1). The crime
rate has increased dramatically during the reform period, although it is still relatively low
compared to international standards (Bakken 2005).
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The very low crime rates during the pre-reform era, which many Chinese citizens now
miss, benefited greatly from the effective use of informal control (Deng and Cordilia 1999).
The strong informal control may have been in part a genuine expression of a homogeneous
“collective conscience” (Durkheim 1964), but was surely also an attempt to enforce strict
rule abidance thought uniformity (Ren 1997). At that time, on the one hand, the ambitions
to commit crimes were checked as the planned economy restrained individual needs (both
materialistic and spiritual) and offered fewer opportunities, and on the other hand, informal
and formal controls were most effective because of individual’s tight bonds to society and a
strong repression of most types of deviance (Deng and Cordilia 1999). For Cao (2007), “the
society free of crime was a by-product of the ruthless repression of all deviants within and
outside the Party, real or imaginary.”
According to Hirschi (1969), “delinquent acts result when individual’s bond to society is
weak or broken.” The modernization in China did not only liberate materialistic ambitions, as
Deng Xiaoping encouraged a “getting rich is glorious” culture (Deng and Cordilia 1999; Zhao
2008; Cao 2007), it also speeded up the mobility of the population. Workplace and
neighborhood, where the social bonds had been very strong and the informal control had been
effective (Deng and Cordilia 1999), became less vital for individuals in China. China is now
experiencing the biggest internal migration movement in history. Urbanization has reduced the
proportion of rural residents in the total population from 82.1% in 1978 to 55.1% in 2007
(National Bureau of Statistics of China 2008). By the end of June of 2007, the migrant
population in Beijing has reached 5.1 Million, while the population who hold a local residence
amounts to 12 Million (Xinhua News, September 19, 2007). Crimes committed by the
migrant population are increasing. For instance, of all criminal cases tried by the No.1
Intermediate People’s Court of Beijing, 12.5% were committed by the floating people in 1990,
13.6% in 1991, 22.6% in 1993, 25.9% in 1994, and 34.1% in 1995 (Ma 2001).
For the urban population, the workplace has ceased to act as a welfare agency and
branch of government, responsible for supplying medical care, child care, housing,
pensions, and lifetime employment (so called ‘Iron Rice Bowl’) as well as authorizing
travel and job transfers (Deng and Cordilia 1999). The mobility of the population and
greater attention for one’s own privacy preclude interventions by neighborhood committees.
The collective forces are losing their authority gradually in China.


















































































Graph 1 Police recorded crime trend in China. Source: from 1950 to 1988, Deng and Cordilia (1999); 1989
to 2006, China Law Yearbook 1990–2007. The crime rates from 1989 to 2006 are based on the year-end total
population numbers published on China Statistical Yearbooks. According to Chinese Criminal Procedure
Law (§ 18), from 1997 on, the procuratorate is responsible for the registration for some offenses such as
crime of embezzlement and bribery
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A state of anomie, whether according to Durkheim (1964) or to Merton (1938), has
developed in China as a result of rapid modernization (Liu and Messner 2001; Deng and
Cordilia 1999; Zhao 2008; Cao 2007). The economic modernization generates great
materialistic ambitions and needs, while social bonds, the informal control relied on in the
past, are weakening. Rising social inequality leads to increases in crime, as the unprivileged
population lacks the legal means to achieve their goals (Cao and Dai 2001). At the same
time, Cohen and Felson’s (1979) routine activity approach can explain why higher living
standards and more goods create a criminogenic context. An exact empirical assessment of
the social forces driving the current crime development in China is beyond the scope of our
paper. Yet, the Chinese criminal justice system undoubtedly faces the challenge to deal with
the consequences of this development.
As the old informal rules and controls are no longer effective, China faces the task
to find new rules and to rebuild effective social control, mainly through state criminal
policies. The direction of the criminal policy is mainly determined by the ruling
ideology and the country’s current position on the road towards the rule of law. In the
past six decades since the founding of the PRC, China experienced a four-stage legal
experiment: (1) law as an instrument for class struggle before the Culture Revolution,
(2) legal nihilism during the Cultural Revolution, (3) law as a pure instrument for social
control during the construction period of the socialist legal system, (4) and beginning
realization of the rule of law after 1997. The development of the role of the law in state
policies has also brought changes in criminal policy. In this paper, we will focus on the
current ‘strike hard’ policy which influences the Chinese criminal justice from all
perspectives. The ‘strike hard’ policy, which decides the scope of capital crimes and the
number of executions, offers a context to understand the Chinese death penalty system
and practice.
Death penalty as an ultimate punishment almost always attracts the highest attention in
the discussion of how to progress towards a humane and effective criminal policy
respecting the rule of law. Public Opinion on the death penalty is one of the obstacles faced
by the international abolition movement. While numerous studies on public opinion on the
death penalty have been conducted in Western nations, this topic remains seriously
understudied in China. Yet, it is of unique relevance for the study of punitiveness because
in the case of China, traditional Confucian values and a socialist, totalitarian ideology blend
in the support for a highly punitive criminal policy. Using data from a comparative student
survey conducted in Germany in 2007, this paper explores the attitudes towards
punishments including the death penalty among Chinese young elites. The comparison
with German students is intended to sharpen the view on differences or communalities
between Eastern and Western punitive attitudes.
On the Road to the Rule of Law
To know how far you are already on the road, it is necessary to know from where you
began. In the following paragraph, we will look back to the role the rule of law has played
in socialist China. As Foucault (1995) and Garland (2001) said, studying the history is
studying the history of present for a better understanding of the present. History may also
indicate some hints for the future.
The establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 made the world’s most
populous country not only the subject of a gigantic political, social, and economic
experiment, but also the subject of a significant legal experiment (Cohen 1968). This
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experiment began with the complete abrogation of all the laws and decrees of the
Kuomingtang period which were deemed as “reactionary” and “Western in spirit” (Zweigert
and Koetz 1998; Cohen 1968). The new rulers began to establish a legal system that would
suit the needs of the newly founded socialist China. The first Constitution was passed in
1954. In the criminal justice field, the old laws were replaced by only a few principal
statutes, such as the Act for Punishing Counterrevolutionaries of 1951, the Provisional Act
for Punishment for Crimes that Endanger State Currency of 1951, the Act for the
Punishment of Corruption of 1952, the Arrest and Detention Act of 1954, the Security
Administration Punishment Act of 1957. These laws served as an instrument to facilitate
the class struggle. For the then communists, criminal punishment was only one coercive
measure of the state and it had no goals in itself (Cohen 1968). The legal professionals from
the old society were dismissed because they insisted on the principle of equality before the
law, an idea which could not be tolerated by the class struggle ideology (Cohen 1968).
From 1949 to 1957, although the law was deemed only as an instrument of control and
repression as a form of totalitarianism, there was still a place for the law in social control.
From the end of 1957 onwards, the “rule of law”, which essentially means judicial
independence, became overshadowed by the “rule of man”, i.e., the communists and later
Mao Zedong himself (Van Straten 1986). This “rule of man” can not be confused with the
Confucian concept of “rule of man”. The socialist “rule of man” served for obstacle-free
manipulation of power (Luo 1998), while the Confucian “rule of man” wishes a well-
ordered society which benefits the moralistic virtue of the righteous and selfless superior
man through his behavioral exemplification (Ren 1997). With the outbreak of the “Great
Proletarian Cultural Revolution” in 1966, the “leftists” dominated the Chinese Communist
Party and this resulted in a virtual “withering away of the law” (Van Straten 1986). As the
laws became meaningless, the apparatus of justice, which had been created in the Soviet
image, broke down completely (Zweigert and Koetz 1998). The function of the prosecution
was exercised by the police and the lawyers were hunted down as “rightists”.
After Mao Zedong`s death and the end of the cultural revolution in 1976, China started
the program of the “Four Modernizations” and built a socialist legal system with Chinese
characteristics, indicating that the government realized that economic development needs a
solid legal infrastructure (Zweigert and Koetz 1998). In 1979, China introduced its first
criminal law and criminal procedure law. This was undoubtedly a huge step towards the
“rule of law”, but codification in itself is not sufficient. The rule of law demands not only
that clear legal rules exist and are enacted, but also that they are fair and just. Until the
middle of the 1990s, legal reforms in China aimed to achieve the goal that there were laws
in the country. Socialist ideology still dominated the first criminal law and criminal
procedure law. Both laws took Marxism–Leninism–Mao Zedong Thought as their guide
(Article 1, Criminal Law of 1979; Article 1, Criminal Procedure Law of 1979). The primary
task of the criminal law was “to use criminal punishment against all counterrevolutionaries”
(Article 2, Criminal Law of 1979). The legal professions were reintroduced but the role of
the defense lawyers was very limited, if not just as a decoration. Legal education was also
reintroduced. But the ideology of socialist dictatorship was reflected widely in the
textbooks (for instance, Gao 1982) in the early 1980s.
The shifting focus on economic reforms and the accompanying social change
increased the demands for legal norms and the rule of law. The ideological color of the
laws gradually faded. China revised its Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure Law
respectively in 1997 and 1996. The socialist ideology, Marxism–Leninism–Mao Zedong
Thought, was no longer mentioned as a guide for the laws. The Criminal Law of 1997
also changed the expression of counterrevolutionary crimes into “crimes of endangering
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national security”. The basic principles of rule of law, such as nulla poena sine lege and
the equality before the law were introduced into the revised criminal law, while the
practice of analogy was abolished. In 1997, the 15th CPC National Congress decided to
make “the rule of law” a basic strategy and “building a socialist country under the rule
of law” an important goal for socialist modernization. In 1999, the sentence “the People’s
Republic of China exercises the rule of law, building a socialist country governed according
to law” was added to the Constitution. In 2004, the phrase “the state respects and guarantees
human rights” was included in the Constitution. The legal experiment in China entered
into a new era. Although still a one-party-state, China is already on the journey to
the rule of law, no matter we still do not know how long this journey will take. The
evaluation of the development of contemporary criminal policy should be based on the
principles of the rule of law: nulla poena sine lege, judicial independence, equal protection,
fair trail, etc.
Responding to Crime with Iron Fist: the Strike Hard Policy
An aspect of supreme significance in contemporary Chinese criminal justice is the
‘strike hard’ policy. ‘Strike hard’ requires that the state apparatus, including police,
prosecution, and the courts, should crackdown on crime with severity and swiftness.
Severity requires harsher punishments, while swiftness intends higher efficiency by
quickening criminal proceedings. The repression policy behind this ideology is a heritage
of the class dictatorship to suppress counterrevolution. According to Deng Xiaoping (1994:
372), the state should exercise the dictatorship over criminals who seriously endanger the
social order, and no mercy should be given. Even in 1992, the then president of the
Supreme People’s Procuratorate Liu Fuzhi still openly expressed the idea that the ‘strike
hard’ is dictatorship (Liu 1992). Even under the current political context to build a
‘harmonious society’, the strike hard policy is still emphasized by the Chinese criminal
policy makers as the harsh side of the new criminal policy ‘combining leniency and
harshness’ (Luo 2005).
The regressive nature of the ‘strike hard’ policy is not completely strange to the Chinese
legal tradition. As it is well-known, the Chinese legal tradition developed mainly from two
adversarial ancient schools of thought: Confucianism and Legalism. As mentioned above,
Confucianism prefers the behavioral exemplification of the superior man’s moralistic virtue.
Good morality results in good behavior. Thus, Confucianism is deemed to be useful for
crime prevention by building morality in the society. Legalism, on the contrary, emphasizes
control through the formal laws. A punitive thought of the Legalism is that “in time of
chaos, harsh laws are needed”, which is similar to the socialist authoritarianism. The strike
hard policy is a modern realization of this traditional repression thought, although in an
excessive way.
The first strike hard campaign was launched in 1983, in times of rapid and anomic
economic take-off. The Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress started this
strike hard campaign by issuing three decisions: Decision Regarding the Severe
Punishment of Criminals Who Seriously Sabotage the Economy of March 8, 1982,
Decision Regarding the Severe Punishment of Criminals Who Seriously Endanger Public
Security, and Decision Concerning the Procedure for Rapid Adjudication of Cases
Involving Criminals Who Seriously Endanger Public Security, both of September 2,
1983. The first campaign included three ‘battles’ and lasted to 1987. Until now, China has
launched three strike hard campaigns in addition to the 1983 campaign, the other two were
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launched in 1996 (from April 1996 to February 1997) and 2001 (from April 2001 to
December 2002).
As to the effects of the strike hard campaigns, the crime trend displayed in Graph 1
indicated that they only had a short-run effect on crime rate trends during the crackdown
period or shortly after. There are no signs that the punitive criminal policy was effective in
changing the upward trend of crimes rates in China (Cao 2007).
However, the real effect of the strike hard policy was to cause disaster to Chinese
criminal justice. The strike hard policy affects the Chinese criminal policy both at the
legislative and judicial levels. We try to analyze the negative effects of this policy by
differentiating severity and swiftness, although both aspects partly have a joint effect on the
administration of criminal justice.
On the legislative level, severity means introducing new offenses or increasing the
punishments. The criminal law of 1979 prescribed 114 offenses, 28 of them carrying the
death penalty. To satisfy the need for repressive social control, before the criminal law was
revised in 1997, 23 separate criminal acts were issued which brought 46 new capital crimes.
The number of capital crimes reached 74. The new criminal law of 1997 reduced the
number of capital crimes to 68, but it was mainly a technical change, because some old
capital crimes were integrated by other capital crimes (Zhang and Liu 2000). The scope of
capital crimes in China is not limited to the ‘most serious crimes’ set by Article 6(2) of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The death penalty can not only be
imposed on violent crimes like murder, but also on non-violent crimes such as economic
crimes.
On the judicial level, the severity results in the frequent use of harsh punishments,
especially the death penalty. There are official data to show that the first strike hard
campaign launched in 1983 caused a massive increase in the use of the death penalty. On
October 31, 1984, the Central Committee of CPC approved and forwarded a “Report on the
summary of the first battle for strike hard campaign against serious criminal offenses and
the planning of the second battle”. This report showed that 24,000 criminals were sentenced
to death during the one-year first battle period (from August 1983 to July 1984)1. The
Notification of the Supreme People’s Court on unified submission of death penalty case
recoding files of April 9, 1984 pointed out, “since the beginning of the strike hard
campaign, the number of recording materials for death penalty cases has increased
dramatically.” Although official statistics about executions are no longer available because
they are deemed as state secret in China, there are more reports on fragmented executions in
different areas on the media2. The harsher punishments during the campaigns clearly
impaired the principle of proportionality, which China adopted in 1997. Article 5 of the
Chinese Criminal Law of 1997 stipulates: “The degree of punishment shall be
commensurate with the crime committed and the criminal responsibility to be borne by
the offender.”
To measure the effect of the strike hard campaign on the sentencing practice, it would be
useful to compare punishment decisions during the crackdown campaign and before or after
the campaign. However, official judicial statistics in China are neither continual nor
complete. Available data from a five-year period (2002 to 2006) provide some opportunity
1 http://www.people.com.cn/GB/historic/1031/3642.html
2 For instance, the report on 12 executions at the beginning of the third strike hard campaign in 2001: http://
english.peopledaily.com.cn/200104/21/eng20010421_68242.html
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to look at the effects of the 2001 to 2002 strike hard campaign. The category ‘more than
5 years imprisonment up to death sentence’ in Graph 2 includes fixed-imprisonment over
5 years, life imprisonment, and death penalty. These sanctions have been lumped together
in order not to disclose the number of death sentences. Graph 2 shows that during the
campaign in 2002, relatively more harsher punishments were imposed (23%), and in the
following years, this share gradually declined until 2006 to 18%. This could be seen as
evidence that sentencing practices were more punitive during the strike hard campaign
(under the assumption that the volume and severity of crimes adjudicated by the courts
remained constant).
In the deterrent logic of the hard policy, both swiftness and certainty of criminal
proceedings are pivotal. The principle of swiftness influences the Chinese criminal policy
mainly in the following three ways:
(1) Deprivation of a fair trail. At the beginning of the strike hard campaign of 1983, the
Decision Concerning the Procedure for Rapid Adjudication of Cases Involving
Criminals Who Seriously Endanger Public Security reduced the appeal period from 10
to 3 days. The power of review and approval of death sentences for some offenses,
such as murder and robbery, was delegated to the provincial higher courts for more
than two decades, until it was been taken back to the Supreme People’s Court on
January 1, 2007. The right of defence is also strongly limited in the Chinese Criminal
Procedure Law of 1996. The suspect has no right to silence, nor a right against self-
incrimination. The role of a defence counsel in the investigation stage is very limited.
Although the council can meet the client to enquire about the case facts and to provide
legal advice, an investigation official may be present. If a case involves state secrets,
the meeting must be approved by the investigation organ. It is commonly admitted
among the defence councils that access to suspects during the investigation stage is
restricted (Albrecht 2006). The existence of the strike hard ideology made the Chinese
government reluctant to strengthen the defence rights of suspects and accused, when
such strengthening constitute an obstacle for the need to crackdown on crime. Since
China decided to construct the rule of law, some significant efforts have been made to
improve the procedural rights of the suspects and accused, besides the take back of
power to review the death penalty to the Supreme People’s Court, from July 1, 2006
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amended Law on Lawyers, which came into effect on June 1, 2008, allows the
lawyers to meet with their clients without being monitored by the investigation
(Article 33).
(2) Impairment of the judicial independence. The strike hard campaigns are launched in
the style of a military mission and organized by the Chinese Communist Party. The
Party’s Political and Legal Commission is the leading organ of the campaigns and
responsible to coordinate the collaboration between the police, the procuratorate, and
the courts. There is little doubt that judicial independence cannot be upheld during
crackdowns. Article 7 of the Chinese Criminal Procedure Law of 1996 provides a
legal basis for the collaboration between the courts, the police, and the procuratorate:
“In conducting criminal proceedings, the people’s courts, the people’s procuratorates
and the public security organs shall divide responsibilities, coordinate their efforts and
check each other to ensure the correct and effective enforcement of law.” During the
strike hard campaigns, it is reasonable to believe that collaboration rather than checks
between these three organs is emphasized.
(3) Theatre effect of punishments and strengthening the punitiviness. During the strike
hard campaign, public arrests and sentencing rallies are routinely performed to show
the state’s authority in order to deter would-be criminals and educate the general
public (Trevaskes 2004). The public arrest in China is a reproduction of the French
theatre show of punishments (Foucault 1995). It dampens not only sympathy for the
fellow human but also strengthens authoritarian beliefs which are positively linked to
punitiviness (Jost et al. 2003).
Public Opinion on the Death Penalty
The Need to Study Public Opinion
Public opinion is frequently cited as a major reason in defence of the death penalty,
sometimes even as an excuse to justify the retention of death penalty (Hood and Hoyle
2008; Schabas 2004). Relying on public opinion to defend the use of the death penalty does
not seem to be a bad strategy, since the “voice of the people” cannot be ignored in a
democratic society. Even more, as Nieburg (1984) pointed out, an inquiry into the decent
opinions of all the citizens is thought to be the first duty of politicians and governments of
any democratic system. In the United States, a liberal parliamentary democracy, not only
the politicians and legislators pay great attention to the public opinion for electoral reasons.
Also the U.S. Supreme Court, who may decide the fate of death penalty in the U.S. through
its decisions interpreting the Eighth Amendment (the cruel and unusual clause) of the U.S.
constitution, treats the public opinion as an indicator of the acceptance of death penalty by
the public. In Weems v. United States (217 U.S. 349 [1910]), the court asserted that the
proscription of cruel and unusual punishments “is not fastened to the obsolete but may
acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice.” A similar
statement appeared in Trop v. Dulles (356 U.S. 86 [1958]) that the cruel and unusual
language “must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society.” In its landmark decision Furman v. Georgia (408 U.S. 238
[1972]), the court accepted the idea of changing community standards embodied by these
precedents but it reached no agreement about the current community standards, nor about
the kind of evidence that might be accepted as a valid indicator of these standards.
Although not directly referring to public opinion, the court in fact considered the public
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opinion as one of the barometers for deciding whether the death penalty violates “evolving
standards of decency” (Dike 1982). Justice Brennan tried to prove this from the opposite in
Furman v. Georgia, as he emphasized the rejection of death penalty “by contemporary
society is virtually total” as one of four principles to deny the death penalty, what Jeremy
Bentham described as “popularity”, one property to be given to a lot of punishment
(Bentham 1843). As Ellsworth and Gross (1994) predicted, if a clear majority of Americans
comes to reject the capital punishment, the supreme Court, if not Congress and the state
legislatures, will soon follow suit.
China, another strong retentionist country, although not a democratic country in the
Western sense, nevertheless relies on the public opinion to refuse abolition in a foreseeable
future. Put aside that the Chinese Communist Party asserts the public as the origin for all
state powers, the reigning ideology, which empathizes social stability as the supreme goal,
does not allow the state to ignore public opinion on the death penalty. At his press
conference on March 14, 2005, the Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao answered the question
whether China was planning to abolish the death penalty, “given our national condition, we
will not abolish the death penalty”. A serious crime situation in the transitional Chinese
society and the popular support for the death penalty are interpreted widely as two key
elements of this “national condition”.3 Public opinion influences crime policies through
different mechanisms. Often, politicians intervene into the still not totally independent
criminal justice system if cases receive a great deal of public attention (Pan 2008).
Independent of this outside influence, the Chinese courts are meant to consider public
sentiments when they decide upon the question of the death penalty. The Supreme People’s
Court (SPC) issued a “Resolution on further strengthening the criminal trial works” in 2007
which requires the courts to consider adequately the acceptance of the society and the
public when deciding the imposition of the death penalty in criminal cases.
Two cases which provoked a lot of discussion in China illustrate very clearly the effect
of public sentiment on the Chinese judiciary. In 2003, SPC sentenced Liu Yong, head of a
crime ring in Shenyang, capital of Liaoning province in Northeast China, to death with
immediate execution. Liu was sentenced to death with a two-year reprieve in the second-
instance trial by the Liaoning Provincial Higher People’s Court which explained in its
ruling that it “could not remove the possibility that Liu’s confession had been extracted
through torture.” Never has an ordinary criminal case caused such a huge media coverage
and public discussion before. The popular appeal for an immediate execution forced SPC,
for the first time, to commence a retrial and to overturn the previous ruling of the second-
instance trail. Another case took place more recently. Xu Ting, a young migrant worker
who deliberately withdrew nearly 175,000 Chinese Yuan (ca. 17500€) from a malfunction-
ing ATM machine in Guangzhou, capital of the prosperous Guangdong province in South
China, was sentenced to life imprisonment in the first trial. Under the current Chinese
criminal law, people who steal 100,000 Chinese Yuan or more from a financial institution
face a life sentence or death. Xu’s life imprisonment stirred a nationwide debate and many
citizens and legal scholars alike expressed that Xu did not deserve such a severe
punishment. The sentence was subsequently reduced dramatically in the retrial in April,
2008 to 5-year imprisonment, a sentence which required the approval of SPC because it
was less than the prescribed punishment (Article 63(2), Chinese Criminal Law). SPC
3 Huang Ermei, the chief judge of the first Criminal Division at the Supreme People’s Court, explained the
national conditions for which the death penalty could not be abolished. See http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/
2008-03/07/content_7738334.htm.
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approved the sentence. Public opinion achieved a “victory” in both cases, even if the
directions of the results were quite different. A more fundamental question is, however,
what price the independence of justice has paid for the “victory” of public opinion.
Although these examples show that public opinion is important for Chinese criminal
justice, yet the attitudes towards punishment in China are seriously understudied, even
with respect to the most controversial sanction, the death penalty (Johnson and Zimring
2006). Only few surveys have touched the issue of the death penalty. The earliest survey
measuring the Chinese attitudes towards the death penalty can be traced back to 1995, as
the Law Institute of Chinese Academy of Social Science and the National Bureau of
Statistics of China conducted a population survey in 1995 by distributing questionnaires
to 5000 respondents in three Chinese provinces, using the single-item question “what is
your attitude towards the death penalty?” 95% of the respondents supported the death
penalty (Hu 2000). In a 2005 non-random student survey conducted in a college in
Northwest China, 93.8% of the 1873 respondents thought murder should be threatened by
death. Among the respondents, 81% were law students (Jia 2006). Scholars in the United
States who are of Chinese origin attempted to get a cross-cultural comparison on the
students’ attitudes towards the death penalty. Using student samples from China and the
United States, Cao and Cullen (2001) explored cross-cultural differences and similarities
in crime ideology. They concluded that Chinese and American ideologies overlap to a
considerable degree, with respondents from both nations manifesting multidimensional
views on crime causation and social control. Their study further suggested, despite these
similarities, cultural differences, especially with regard to the exercise of state power
within the criminal justice system. 78.2% of Chinese students agreed with the statement “I
believe that capital punishment should be used because people who take a life deserve to
be punished by having their own life taken,” while only 59.4% of Americans agreed.
They also found that Chinese college students were more likely than American college
students to favour rehabilitation as a method to deal with offenders in general. A great
limitation of these finding is that the data were collected in 1988, which cannot reflect the
political, economical and cultural changes China has experienced thereafter (Jiang et al.
2007). Comparing 524 Chinese students from a Chinese university and 484 American
students from a university in the United States, Jiang et al. (2007) found nearly 70% of
the Chinese sample supported the death penalty and about 60% did so in the United States.
They further found that deterrence is the most important reason for the Chinese students
supporting the death penalty, while retribution was for the Americans. Liang et al. (2006)
compared Chinese college students both at home and in the United States to explore whether
the exposure to Western values has an effect on the change of death penalty attitudes. That
study proved that the incapacitation ideology related positively to pro-death penalty
attitudes. When alternative punishments were provided, although the majority of
respondents still favoured the death penalty, the magnitude of support and its significant
sources of variability declined substantially. The study found further that the overseas
Chinese students were more supportive of the death penalty than the students at home (83%
vs. 62.7%, after providing alternatives 68.4% vs. 52.6%), contrary to expectation. The very
small samples sizes (60 in China, 57 in the U.S.) should caution against putting too much
weight on these findings. Below, we present the findings from our own survey.
Student Websurvey on Punitiveness and the Death Penalty
Following the examples of previous studies in North America, we pursued a survey among
Chinese students currently studying at German universities, and in addition drew a sample
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of U.S.-American and German students from the same universities for comparative
purposes. The survey was designed as a web survey, with the option to fill in a shorter
paper questionnaire sent out with the second reminder letter.
Eight German universities (of the 15 approached) participated in the study. Two of the
eight are technical universities, five are located in the former Western and three in the
former Eastern part of Germany. The sampling frame within the participating universities
consists of all students of Chinese nationality (without citizens of Hong Kong, Macao and
Taiwan), all students of U.S. nationality, and a random sample of German students drawn
from those courses and departments predominantly chosen by Chinese students. The total
number of students who were invited to participate are 2617 Chinese, 802 U.S. and 1075
German students. The U.S. sample will not be used in the following analyses because it is
fairly small and displays a disciplinary shape which is very distinct from the Chinese and
German sample, with the majority of students in social science and humanities courses,
whereas the Chinese (and by definition also the German) students predominantly focus on
natural sciences, engineering, health studies, law, economy and languages.
Personalized invitation letters in the respective first languages were sent by postal mail
by the universities on behalf of the research institute. This procedure also helps to stress the
anonymity of the data collection. The web survey was accessible only for invited students
with a global password in order to protect the online questionnaire from unauthorized
access. The questionnaire was available in German, English and Chinese. All students were
sent two reminder letters, the second containing also a much shorter paper version of the
questionnaire in order to boost participation especially among students who may be
reluctant to participate in online surveys or who have had less time to spare. We did not
give any monetary incentives. The survey took place in spring 2007.
The overall response rates are 35% (25% for the online version) for Chinese and 46%
(37% for the online version) for German students (see Table 1). These results show that (1)
the response rates are satisfactory for a web administered survey, yet (2) the option to fill in
a paper questionnaire increases participation quite considerably, for the Chinese students by
almost half.
This raises the question whether students who filled in the paper version answered
differently from those who used the online questionnaire. In fact, very few items show
significantly different distributions. For most of the key variables of interest, such as
support for the death penalty, both interview modes produced indistinguishable results.
Thus, we will report results for the total sample whenever questions occurred in both modes
Table 1 Sample size and response rates
Student population Web interviews Paper interviews Total
N= % N= % N= %
China 2617 639 25.4a 257 9.8b 896 35.2
Germany 1075 413 37.0a 96 9.0b 509 46.0
a Corrected for an estimated number of 35 Chinese respondents who answered the German version of the
web survey and of whom only 13 can be identified and removed from the German sub sample
b Percentage based on complete student population. Deducing one university which did not distribute paper
questionnaires from the denominator, the response rates for the paper version would be 11.5% for China and
12.5% for Germany.
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and results for the web sample only whenever a question was only used in the web
questionnaire.
To measure attitudes towards crime, punishment, and related social cognitions, we
employed scales consisting mainly of items which have often been used in previous
research. However, cross-cultural survey research poses the difficult task of finding scales
which represent reliable measurements of theoretical constructs in more than one country or
language (Harkness et al. 2003). We excluded many items which showed signs of
differential item functioning and retained only those items which showed similarly high
factor loadings (>.50 with some exceptions) in all sub samples and lead to fairly reliable
scales judged by their Cronbach’s alpha values. This resulted in mostly short scales with
modest reliabilities (see details in appendix, Table 4).4
Descriptive Results
We start the analyses of punitive attitudes by comparing the means of Chinese and German
students for three central scales: ‘punitiveness’, ‘rehabilitation’, ‘criminal personality’.
While the first scale measures the belief in the need and effectiveness of harsh punishments
(including the death penalty) to combat crime, the second scale measures the belief that
offenders’ social behavior can and should be improved by re-educative and inclusive
instruments. The scale ‘criminal personality’ expresses the belief that the causes of crime
rest with the offender’s personality which is largely determined by inheritance. All three
scales have been constructed following the study by Mascini and Houtman (2006). Graph 3
shows that Chinese students are not only significantly more punitive, but, at the same time,
also significantly more supportive of the idea of rehabilitation than German students. While











 China Germany 
 N= Missing values  N= Missing values 
Punitiveness  896 8.6% 515 4.7% 
rehabilitation  896 7.8% 515 4.7% 
Criminal personality 639 11.0% 419 5.5% 
Graph 3 Mean differences be-
tween Chinese and German stu-
dents in central scales of punitive
attitudes
4 We would like to thank Philip Bornkessel and Andreas Daniel, sociology students at Bielefeld university,
for their help in performing these analyses.
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mean value below the neutral mid-point of the Likert-type scale at 2.5, the Chinese are on
average slightly positive. However, the idea of rehabilitation has much more support among
both groups, and it does not appear that a more punitive attitude of the Chinese students is
associated with a weaker belief in rehabilitation (see below for correlational analyses). Both
groups are equally clear in an almost complete rejection of the idea that crime is caused by
inherited defects.
How strongly do Chinese students support the death penalty which is a crucial facet of
punitiveness (Table 2)? In response to a standard item measuring the general attitude
towards the death penalty, 69% are in favor and 19% oppose this punishment; 12%,
Table 2 General support for the death penalty
Q: “In general, do you favor or oppose the death penalty?”
I am in favour I oppose I am not sure Total
China 69,0 19,3 11,8 100%
Germany 10,5 72,0 17,5 100%
Cramer’s V=.58***
China: N=896, missing values=1.5%; Germany: N=515, missing values=0.2%















Graph 4 Support for the death penalty for specific crimes. China, N=896, missing values 4.1% to 11.9%
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considerably less than German students, chose to be undecided. This confirms previous
findings that there is a large majority of death penalty supporters among Chinese students,
and is in a stark contrast to the reverse distribution among German students, of whom 72%
oppose and only 10.5% favor the death penalty. Clearly, the respective criminal policies of
the two countries are reflected in both the positive and the negative attitudes towards the
death penalty.
Research in Western countries has attempted to call into question the seemingly
monolithic and overwhelming support for the death penalty by using more specific and
sophisticated questions on the death penalty (Cullen et al. 2000). We follow the same
strategy in our study. First, if asked whether they support the death penalty for specific
crimes, most respondents would limit its use to very few and serious crimes as murder and
terrorism (Graph 4). 85% of the Chinese respondents support the death penalty as the
highest penalty for murder. However, two non-lethal crimes, sexual abuse of children and
drug dealing, are of enough symbolic salience for more than half of the Chinese
respondents to justify the death penalty. All other crimes do not warrant the use of the death
penalty in the eyes of the majority of Chinese students. Yet, a support of more than 40% for
the death penalty for corruption and the organization of prostitution represents still a strong
inclination towards this punishment.
Second, previous research has often shown that respondents are much more reluctant to
apply the death penalty if asked to choose a punishment in individual (hypothetical) cases.
Again, this finding is confirmed in our survey. We take advantage of the technique of
randomization to employ three different vignettes with a 2×2 factorial design resulting in
four slightly different versions of each case in order to measure the elasticity of the
respondents’ penal preferences in reaction to varying degrees of offence severity and
mitigating factors (for details of the vignettes, see Appendix). The randomized allocation of
versions among respondents has the advantage that the resulting differences are solely
attributable to the different cues given in the vignettes (Durham 1986; Goudriaan and
Nieuwbeerta 2007).
The overarching finding represented in Graph 5 is that in none of the versions of the
three vignettes does the support for the death penalty climb to 40% or more. In the most







version  A version B version C version D
case 1 - lethal robbery
case 2 - corruption
case 3 - drug trafficking
China N=639, missing values 4.9% - 6.6% 
Case 1: cramer’s V = .22 *** 
Case 2: cramer’s V = .08 n.s. 
Case 3: cramer’s V = .13 * 
Graph 5 Support for the death
penalty in randomized vignettes
150 S. Qi, D. Oberwittler
less than 40% of the Chinese respondents chose the death penalty as an appropriate
punishment. In case 2 which is about a local official who takes bribes none of the varying
circumstances justifies the death penalty for all but very few respondents, and in the drug
trafficking vignette, the death penalty is chosen by only between 8% and 20% of
respondents. These findings underline that for the majority of respondents, the death
penalty is an exceptional punishment reserved for the gravest cases of murder.
A final question on the death penalty asks whether people would be ready to agree to its
abolition if an alternative, harsh custodial sentence was available (Cullen et al. 2000).
Again, we used the strategy to randomly give three different versions representing
increasing levels of sanction severity (Graph 6). In the mildest version, the alternative to
death penalty is life imprisonment with parole (the possibility of early release), in the more
severe version, it is life imprisonment without parole, and in the most severe version, the
prisoners’ earnings are given to the victims’ family as compensation. Each step results in a
significant increase of the share of respondents who would agree to an abolition of the
death penalty, yet 50% of respondents would still oppose abolition when offered the most
severe prison alternative.
To sum up the descriptive findings reported so far, our survey confirms both the
relatively high level of basic support for the death penalty among Chinese students and the
findings from opinion research in Western countries that the support levels are
considerably lower if one steps beyond the simple standard question and asks more
specific questions about specific crimes and cases, or offers alternative sanctions which
fulfill some of the aims of punishment which drive the support for the punishment (it
remains questionable whether these alternatives really represent much of a penal progress,
though).
Multivariate Analysis on the Correlates of Punitiveness
As the final step of analysis in this paper, we turn to multivariate analyses in order to find
correlational patterns between support for the death penalty and other relevant social
attitudes. Which attitudes and social cognitions differentiate supporters and opponents of
the death penalty in China, compared to Germany? At this early stage of analysis, we prefer
to talk about exploratory findings and correlates of punitiveness rather than about






support abolition undecided oppose abolition
China, N=639, missing values 2% 
Cramer’s V = .13 *** 
Graph 6 Attitude towards the
abolition of the death penalty
and its replacement by life im-
prisonment (3 randomized
alternatives)
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explanations or even causes. More in-depth and multivariate analysis is necessary to
establish the links between punitive attitudes and other domains of social perceptions and
attitudes.
There is a long tradition in sociology, and especially social psychology, to associate
punitive attitudes with more fundamental perceptions and interpretations of society and
social relations. In the Durkheimian tradition, the need to punish deviants reflects the desire
to emphasize and re-inforce social norms which are perceived as under threat by deviants
(Durkheim 1992). In this perspective, punitiveness is related to anxieties about social
decline (of which norm breaking is one symptom) and a lack of social cohesion (Maruna
and King 2004; Tyler and Boeckmann 1997). Moreover, in Western societies, punitiveness
is often seen as a part of ideological cleavages, i.e. the support for harsh punishments, and
of the death penalty is seen as associated with conservative and authoritarian mentalities
(Jost et al. 2003).
Only some of these hypotheses and their applicability to China are put to a test in the
regression models reported in Table 3. We intend to test the following hypotheses: (1)
support for the death penalty is an indicator of punitiveness more generally, thus people
who are more punitive are also more likely to support the death penalty reflecting
consistency in penal attitudes; (2) rehabilitation as an aim of punishment distinct from
deterrence and retribution is negatively associated with support for the death penalty; (3)
belief in criminal personalities and implicitly the belief that (some) criminals cannot be
reformed is positively linked to support for the death penalty (4) authoritarianism is
positively associated with support for the death penalty via its low tolerance for rule
breaking and deviance in general, (5) strong fears and concerns about crime as a societal
problem as well as low generalized trust are positively related to support for the death
penalty.
The models reported in Table 3 use the scale ‘support for the death penalty for specific
crimes’ as dependent variable because it fine-grades the death penalty attitudes and is
suitable for OLS regression analysis. Although not reported in detail, socio-demographic
control variables used in the models include age, sex, and father’s SES. The only significant
correlation between socio-demographic variables and the outcome is a negative effect of
age on support for the death penalty for the German subsample: younger students are more
Table 3 Regression of the support for the death penalty for specific crimes on related social attitudes
CHINA GERMANY
beta t-value sign. beta t-value sign.
intercept 0.19 1.6 0.12 1.7
punitiveness 0,40 8,5 *** 0,29 5,3 ***
rehabilitation −0,05 −1,2 −0,15 −3,2 **
criminal personality 0,09 1,9 + 0,02 0,4
authoritarianism 0,02 0,4 0,22 3,8 ***
generalized fear of crime −0,04 −1,0 −0,01 −0,3
generalized trust −0,02 0,7 −0,16 −3,4 ***
R2 .19 .28
(controlling also for sex, age, and father’s SES)
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punitive in Germany than older students. Notably, sex does not have an effect on the death
penalty attitudes for Chinese nor for German students.
Hypothesis (1), which is a test of consistency rather than a substantial theoretical
argument, is strongly supported by the empirical findings, both for Chinese and German
students. In fact, it turns out to be almost the only significant predictor in the Chinese
model because it shares some variance with other predictors and mediates their
correlational influence on the outcome. Only ‘criminal personality’ approaches
significance independent of general punitiveness. On the level of zero-order correlations
(not reported), also authoritarianism (r= .19) and rehabilitation (r=−.08) show
significant correlations in the expected directions. Neither trust nor fear of crime are
correlated with support for the death penalty in the Chinese sample even on the
bivariate level.
In contrast, the regression model for the German subsample shows more and stronger
effects resulting in a larger share of explained variance (R2=.28 vs. .19 for the Chinese
sample). There are moderate effects of rehabilitation, authoritarianism and trust independent
of the overwhelming effect of punitiveness.
These findings, which we would interpret as a starting point rather than a
consolidated result, show that support for the death penalty is harder to predict in
China in the context of broader attitudinal patterns compared to European countries.
One of the main reasons for this probably is the fact that levels of support for the death
penalty are so much higher in China, which reflects the basic acceptance of state
criminal policies by most Chinese citizens. To support the death penalty, which is a
basic fact of life in China, it does not need particular social attitudes which supporters
of the death penalty in Western countries typically hold, nor is it an issue of ideological
cleavages between conservatives and progressives, as it is the case in public opinion in
the U.S.
Conclusion
Chinese crime rates have increased during recent modernization. The old informal rules
which kept crime under control for many decades are no longer functional. After
building a socialist legal system with Chinese characteristics during the first two
decades since the initiation of economic reforms in 1978, China is now on the road to
the rule of law. In the criminal justice field, China has made much praiseworthy
progress, e.g. the introduction of nulla poena sine lege into criminal law in 1997.
However, as the strike hard policy most forcefully shows, criminal law in China is still
an instrument of repression. Authoritarianism is still the reigning ideology of the state.
However, the rule of law requires a balance of treatment and protection. In State v.
Makwanyane & Another (Case No. CCT/3/94, 1995), which outlawed the death penalty
in South Africa, Arthur Chaskalson, the President of the South African Constitutional
Court argued eloquently, “the very reason for establishing the new legal order, and for
vesting the power of judicial review in the courts, was to protect the rights of minorities
and others who cannot protect their rights adequately through the democratic process.”
Repression, even of criminals, is not compatible with rule of law. The student survey
shows that even the young Chinese elites are very punitive. Short of saying that the
punitive criminal policy in China caused popular punitiveness, we would argue that the
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Chinese state provides a punitive culture to its citizens which contributes to and reinforces
popular attitudes.
Yet, we do not think that public support for the death penalty is a good reason for a
retentionist state to refuse abolition. As scholars analyzing the abolition movement (Hood
and Hoyle 2008; Zimring and Hawkins 1986) have pointed out, the death penalty has been
abolished in West Germany, the United Kingdom, France and Canada despite a majority
support for it. As Zimring and Hawkins (1986) have observed, the support for the death
penalty usually diminishes after its abolition. For instance, the support level for the death
penalty in West Germany has dropped from 55% in 1950 to 23% in 2000 (Noelle-Neumann
and Koecher 2002).
This shows that the relationship between public opinion on the death penalty and the
death penalty itself works like a vicious circle: State policies and legal practices
influence public opinion, and public opinion then becomes a force of resistance against
reforms of state policies. Therefore, one should not postpone abolition until public
opinion has finally changed, but change the criminal policies without waiting for public
opinion to change.
Appendix
Table 4 Attitude scales with reliability measures
Items Labels Germany China
punitivness Cronbach’s Alpha= ,799 ,766
punit1r People who break the law should be given stiffer sentences. ,509 ,458
punit4r The death penalty deters future criminals ,548 ,595
punit5r Harsh punishments only harden young offenders and aggravate
the crime problem.
,444 ,387
punit6r Young people would commit less crime if jail sentences were tougher ,694 ,637
punit8r Severe penalties deter potential felons ,721 ,610
rehabilitation Cronbach’s Alpha = ,495 ,729
punit9r The judiciary should make efforts to prevent ex-convicts feeling
excluded from the community
,223 ,456
punit10r Re-education is an effective instrument for solving crime ,223 ,674
punit11r Community service orders increase convicts’ feelings of responsibility ,387 ,564
criminal personality Cronbach’s Alpha = ,629 ,642
cause1r Murderers and rapists commit crime because they have evil minds ,370 ,344
cause2r Criminality is largely hereditary ,391 ,447
cause4r Once a thief always a thief ,436 ,479
cause6r Most inmates are born criminals ,544 ,483
authoritarianism Cronbach’s Alpha = ,622 ,596
autor1r Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues
children should learn
,463 ,424
autor2r Most problems would be solved if we could somehow get rid of
immoral people
,391 ,375
autor3r One good way to teach children right from wrong is to give them a
good spanking when they misbehave
,463 ,418
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